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The South Carolina Supreme Court considered a number of
alimony issues in 1977. These included the proper factors under-
lying an alimony award and the situations justifying its modifica-
tion.
Justice Ness wrote the opinion of the court in Nienow v.
Nienow. I This divorce action was instituted in August 1972 in the
Court of Common Pleas of Sumter County. In addition to divorce,
plaintiff sought to recover permanent alimony of $500,000, tem-
porary alimony, and attorney's fees. 2 As grounds for divorce she
alleged physical cruelty, habitual drunkeness, and adultery.3
The parties were married in April 1971 after almost three
years of cohabitation. Defendant possessed wealth in excess of
four million dollars and throughout the marriage he had given
plaintiff a monthly check for three hundred dollars. Plaintiff also
"enjoyed numerous extended vacations, as well as hunting and
fishing expeditions, throughout the United States and Canada."'
Defendant retired in 1968 and had recently undergone open heart
surgery. Plaintiff, on the other hand, was young and in good
health; she was capable of self support even though she appar-
ently made no contributions to defendant's wealth at any time
during the marriage.
Despite plaintiff's allegations to the contrary, the circuit
court found, and the supreme court agreed, that no evidence of
any substantial marital misconduct on the part of either party
existed. The Master recommended an alimony award of $15,000,
emphasizing that plaintiff was "perfectly capable of supporting
herself if she exert[ed] a proper effort to find gainful employ-
ment."' He concluded that she was "entitled to a reasonable sum
to enable her to support herself through a period of adjustment,
to a state of gainful employment."6 The circuit court judge's find-
ing is not as clear as that of the Master. Aside from the conclusion
1. 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
2. Record, vol. 1, at 8-9.
3. Id. at 6-8. For statutory grounds for divorce see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (1976).
4. 268 S.C. at 171, 232 S.E.2d at 509.
5. Record, vol. 4 at 877.
6. Id. at 882.
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that a Florida divorce decree barred plaintiffs divorce action,7 he
concluded that the record of the case did not support plaintiff's
entitlement to alimony. While agreeing that $15,000 was a rea-
sonable sum if any alimony was awarded, he emphasized that a
wife is not automatically entitled to alimony and that "the bur-
den of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish her entitlement" in
any case.' He concluded that plaintiff had not satisfied her bur-
den, and so was not entitled to an award.9
On appeal to the supreme court, Justice Ness explained the
proper method of determining a wife's entitlement to alimony.
Quoting froni his opinion in the 1975 case of Beasley v. Beasley,'0
he said:
Alimony is founded upon the legal duty of the husband to
support his wife. It is not intended as a penalty against him, nor
as a reward to the wife. While the financial condition of the
husband, and the needs of the wife are important, they are not
the only essentials to consider in determining the amount. There
must also be considered all other circumstances of the particular
case such as the age and health of the parties, their respective
earning capacity, their individual wealth, the amount she con-
tributed to the accumulation thereof and the conduct of the
parties."
Also to be considered are the necessities of the parties and the
standard of living of the wife at the time of divorce. He observed
that a number of other jurisdictions have accorded weight to the
length of the marriage, the husband's ability to pay alimony, and
the parties' actual income.'" Justice Ness then pointed out that a
wife's employment does not foreclose an alimony award.' 3 In hold-
ing unreasonably low the $15,000 award recommended by the
Master, he referred to plaintiff's "accustomed standard of wealth,
the disparity between the parties' wealth, and their respective
earning capacities" as particularly significant circumstances in
the case."
7. See notes 37.40, and accompanying text infra.
8. Record, vol. 4, at 944-46.
9. Id.
10. 264 S.C. 611, 216 S.E.2d 535 (1975).
11. 268 S.C. at 170, 232 S.E.2d at 509 (quoting Beasley v. Beasley, 264 S.C. at 612-
13, 216 S.E.2d at 535-36).
12. 268 S.C. at 171, 232 S.E.2d at 509. In a footnote to its discussion of factors
accorded weight in other jurisdictions, the court cites Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 123 (1965).
13. 268 S.C. at 171, 232 S.E.2d at 509 (citing Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133
S.E.2d 323 (1963); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 233(6) (1959)).
14. 268 S.C. at 172, 232 S.E.2d at 510.
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The holding of the case on the alimony issue is not unusual.
Justice Ness cited ample South Carolina authority for every fac-
tor that he designated as significant in determining the proper
amount of alimony. The case is valuable, however, because it
states the relevant factors in unequivocal terms. For this reason
the case will undoubtedly become standard authority in future
divorce cases involving a disputed alimony award.
The opinion is also significant because of its use of the ration-
ale underlying an alimony award. The Master apparently as-
sumed that plaintiff was required to support herself as soon as
possible and that the purpose of the $15,000 was to provide sup-
port until she was able to do so. He undoubtedly realized that the
sum was not all that the court could reasonably ask defendant to
pay to maintain plaintiff in her accustomed standard of living,
yet he seemed to believe that defendant need not support her at
all once she was able to locate a job.
Although the supreme court did not object to the Master's
findings of fact concerning the status of the two parties, it re-
jected the Master's recommendation nonetheless because of its
implicit assumption that a husband has no continuing duty to
support his divorced wife. Justice Ness clearly stated that in
South Carolina alimony is a substitute for a husband's duty to
support his wife and that he must support her in her accustomed
standard of living insofar as he is reasonably able.' 5 The Master's
error, then, was his misunderstanding of the purpose of an ali-
mony award. Justice Ness left little doubt that a husband's duty
to his wife extends beyond an obligation merely to support her
through the period of transition following a divorce. His duty to
her, on the contrary, is scarcely diminished by the interposition
of a divorce decree.
One of the first cases to cite Nienow for the factors to be
weighed in determining alimony was Bailey v. Bailey. This di-
vorce case was instituted by the wife in the Lexington County
Family Court. The court granted the divorce and awarded plain-
tiff $200 per month permanent alimony. She appealed to the
supreme court, claiming that the trial court had failed to consider
a number of factors so that its award was an abuse of discretion.'7
The supreme court agreed with her contention in an opinion by
Justice Gregory. Justice Gregory first reiterated the well-
15. Id.
16. 269 S.C. 1, 235 S.E.2d 801 (1977).
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established precept that the judge in a divorce action "is given
broad discretion in deciding questions of alimony.""8 He then
referred to the Nienow opinion and listed the factors that Justice
Ness had mentioned in the earlier case. 9 Of particular import-
ance to Justice Gregory were the financial condition of the hus-
band, the needs of the wife, and her ability to support herself.
Defendant had a net worth of between $50,000 and $60,000 and
an annual income of around $15,000. Plaintiff was in her mid-
forties and had suffered from severe arthritis for nine years. She
was able to walk, but unable to do heavy housework or assume
employment outside the home. In addition to her inability to
support herself financially, she incurred substantial expenses
because of her poor health, including large medical expenses and
the cost of hiring a maid to do housework. The $200 per month
barely covered her living expenses and she was clearly unable to
supplement that amount by her own efforts. Justice Gregory
pointed out that the wife's health is traditionally considered an
important element in evaluating a wife's entitlement to alimony
because of both the added expenses and the diminished earning
capacity attendant to poor health."0
After deciding that the alimony award was unreasonably low,
the court cautioned the lower court that in evaluating plaintiff's
ability to support herself, it must not consider that she allowed
her mother and emancipated son to live in the house with her
without paying rent." The family court had recognized that to
increase her income plaintiff could require them to pay her.2 2 The
court provided that if either should move out of the house, the
monthly alimony would be increased to $250 and that if both
moved out, to $300. In invalidating the trial court's approach, the
supreme court commented that the presence of the mother and
son in the house should be disregarded because alimony is the
replacement for the husband's duty to support his wife and,
therefore, contributions of the wife's relatives to her support can-
not be considered by the court.23
The supreme court's conclusion on this issue, however, is not
18. 269 S.C. at 4, 235 S.E.2d at 802 (citing Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d
619 (1965)).
19. 269 S.C. at 4, 235 S.E.2d at 802.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 6, 235 S.E.2d at 803.
22. Id. at 6, 235 S.E.2d at 802.
23. Id. at 6, 235 S.E.2d at 803 (citing Hulcher v. Hulcher, 177 Va. 12, 12 S.E.2d 767
(1941); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 233(6) (1959)).
[Vol. 30
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clearly supported by the cited authority. It is, as the court asserts,
an established principle in most jurisdictions that contributions
from relatives are disregarded in ascertaining a wife's financial
condition." Although her earnings may be taken into account as
a basis for reducing her need for alimony, it is "generally recog-
nized that gratuitous contributions," from whatever source,
"neither indicate a diminished need for support nor reduce her
husband's duty to furnish it." The question remains, however,
whether payment of rent by a relative is equivalent to a gratui-
tous contribution. Implicit in the supreme court's analysis is the
assumption that even if plaintiff's mother and son had actually
paid rent, the court would have to disregard those payments as
gratuitous contributions. Clearly, however, not all rental pay-
ments are gratuitous contributions. If instead of letting her
mother and son live in the house Mrs. Bailey had rented the
rooms, her income from that rental would have been properly
considered by the court in ascertaining her financial needs and
abilities.26 Arguably, then, the house should be considered the
wife's asset, as it is when it actually produces rental income.
However the wife chooses to use the house, therefore, it would be
counted as a potential source of income to her and would reduce
the amount of support needed from the husband.
The supreme court's opinion in Bailey should be viewed as
an affirmative rejection of this argument rather than merely as a
routine application of established law. Essentially, the court im-
plied that even though a house is capable of producing income,
the wife will not be expected to put the house to its most profita-
ble use. This conclusion is not without justification in light of the
court's role in settling the rights of the parties. A husband is not
required to exert every possible effort to maximize his ability to
support his wife." Conversely to put this burden upon the wife
for her own support would be unreasonable. Furthermore, to treat
the wife's home as no more than an economic resource would
abrogate the court's equitable prerogative. Good reason exists to
hold that a wife should be able to use her home as she pleases,
because a home is fundamental to a person's comfort and choice
24. 269 S.C. at 6, 235 S.E.2d at 803.
25. Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 123, 160 (1965).
26. See Trammell v. Trammell, 268 S.C. 144, 232 S.E.2d 339 (1977).
27. See Beasley v. Beasley, 264 S.C. 611, 216 S.E.2d 535 (1975); Graham v. Graham,
253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970); Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965);
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of lifestyle. In Bailey the supreme court extended an established
principle of law beyond the point to which it is normally ex-
tended, and in so doing reached an equitable result that, in itself,
was well within the court's discretion.
In Camp v. Camp, 28 the defendant, a practicing psychiatrist,
earned over $140,000 in 1975. Shortly after his wife filed her origi-
nal divorce action, he abandoned his private practice and joined
the staff of the state hospital at an annual salary of less than
$50,000.29 In a per curiam opinion the court affirmed without
discussion a monthly alimony award of $390 and advised the bar:
While dismissing the case under Rule 23, it is in order to
call the attention of the bench and bar to the fact that this Court
will closely scrutinize the facts of any case wherein a husband
and father voluntarily changes employment so as to lessen his
earning capacity and, in turn, his ability to pay alimony and
child support monies. The trial judge has ordered payment in
keeping with the ability of the defendant to earn and pay,
though not necessarily in keeping with his new income status °
It is widely established that a court may consider a hus-
band's potential, rather than actual, income when he deliberately
reduces his salary and becomes unable to pay alimony or child
support at the level at which he is capable.31 This is especially
true when, as in this case, the husband does so shortly before or
during the trial.32
The supreme court's position, therefore, is well founded. The
court, however, did not specify how closely it will scrutinize these
cases nor how strictly it will construe the general rule that a
husband may not intentionally lower his own income to his di-
vorced wife's detriment. Although it is finding increased accept-
ance, the rule usually applies only when the husband's income
reduction results from bad faith; that is, when he deliberately
attempts to avoid his family financial responsibilities by reducing
his own income.33 In Camp, however, the family court did not find
28. 269 S.C. 173, 236 S.E.2d 814 (1977).
29. Record at 93-94.
30. 269 S.C. at 174, 236 S.E.2d at 815.
31. In re Marriage of McCarthy, 533 P.2d 928 (Colo. App. 1975); Vaught v. Vaught,
22 Misc. 356, 195 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 6, 47-48 (1965); 27A
C.J.S. Divorce § 233(3) (1959).
32. Weiss v. Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. App. 1965).
33. See, Philbin v. Philbin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 115, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1971); Weiss v.
Weiss, 392 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. App. 1965); Bowes v. Bowes, 287 N.C. 163, 214 S.E.2d 40
(1975); Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 6, 47 (1965 & Supp. August 1977).
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that defendant abandoned his private practice because of a desire
to avoid his obligation to plaintiff. The only finding was that he
voluntarily depressed his income; no reason was given. 4 Defen-
dant testified that in his private practice he had worked eighty
hours a week and that he changed jobs in order to have more
leisure time. In his new job with the hospital he would work forty
hours a week, but would have the option of seeing private patients
on his own time. 5 He argued on appeal that one could infer from
the record that he changed jobs to start a new life after a trau-
matic divorce and that he could simply no longer sustain the
rigorous burden of maintaining his previous income. The su-
preme court's opinion, however, does not disclose whether the
court reviewed the record and found bad faith or did not require
a finding of bad faith on the husband's part.
Apparently, then, the supreme court applied the general rule
in the case without a finding of bad faith on the part of defendant.
Although it may be unwise to speculate on the basis of one deci-
sion, seemingly the court will take a rather strict approach when
a husband voluntarily depresses his income. Just how closely it
intends to scrutinize these cases is still uncertain.
B. Divisible Divorce Doctrine
In addition to its discussion of alimony awards Nienow v.
Nienow7 illustrates an application of the divisible divorce doc-
trine. The parties were married in April 1971 in Florida, where
they were domiciled until their separation on June 1, 1972.38 At
that time plaintiff moved to Sumter County, South Carolina, and
defendant remained in Florida. Two months later, on August 2,
defendant filed for divorce in Florida. On August 4 plaintiff filed
for divorce, alimony, and attorney's fees in South Carolina. The
Florida court did not secure in personam jurisdiction over plain-
tiff so it did not adjudicate her entitlement to alimony, but it
issued a divorce decree on February 1, 1973, while plaintiffs ac-
tion was still pending in South Carolina. The Master appointed
by the court in plaintiff's South Carolina suit found, and the trial
court agreed, that the Florida decree effectively dissolved the
marriage and no divorce decree should issue from the South Caro-
34. 269 S.C. at 174-75, 236 S.E.2d at 815; Record at 100.
35. Record at 70.
36. Id. at 14.
37. 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
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lina court." Moreover, plaintiff had not resided in South Carolina
for the full year requisite to the maintenance of a divorce action
in this State; hence, she was not entitled to a South Carolina
divorce.40
The issue remained, however, whether plaintiff was never-
theless entitled to ask the court for an alimony award and attor-
neys' fees. The referee decided that because the Florida court had
not obtained in personam jurisdiction over plaintiff and the
South Carolina court had in personam jurisdiction over defen-
dant,' the divisible divorce doctrine applied and even though full
faith and credit had to be accorded the Florida divorce decree,
that decree did not preclude the South Carolina court from
awarding alimony and attorney's fees.2 The trial court, however,
found that plaintiff's intent in establishing a residence in South
Carolina was only to obtain a favorable forum for litigation, so the
divisible divorce doctrine was inapplicable and the South Caro-
lina court could grant her no relief.
4 3
The supreme court reversed, holding plaintiff's intent in es-
tablishing residence in South Carolina is irrelevant to the appli-
cation of the divisible divorce doctrine as long as she voluntarily
submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction and the court pro-
cured in personam jurisdiction over defendant.4 The court first
agreed with the Master that under the divisible divorce doctrine,
the Florida decree was not a bar to the South Carolina action for
alimony and attorneys' fees, because the Florida court lacked the
personal jurisdiction over plaintiff that was required to adjudi-
cate her property rights." As to South Carolina's jurisdiction over
the parties, the court pointed out that in independent actions for
alimony or support, unlike in actions for divorce, no statutory
residence requirements exist." Therefore, the South Carolina
court was empowered to adjudicate the alimony issue by virtue
39. Id. at 940.
40. Id. at 881; see S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-3-30 (1976) for statutory residency require-
ments.
41. Although defendant initially contested the South Carolina court's in personam
jurisdiction over him, that issue was not raised on appeal.
42. Record, vol. 4, at 881. The master cited Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133
S.E.2d 323 (1963), in applying the divisible divorce doctrine.
43. Record, vol. 4, at 941-43.
44. 268 S.C. at 167, 232 S.E.2d at 507.
45. 268 S.C. at 166, 232 S.E.2d at 507.
46. Id. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-30 (1976). As to a court of equity's inherent juris-
diction to entertain an independent suit for alimony, see Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C.
90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951).
[Vol. 30
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of its personal jurisdiction over the parties and the lack of statu-
tory limitations. The jurisdictional issue was therefore largely
limited to an examination of whether the court should invoke the
discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens.47 The court recog-
nized that a plaintiffs choice of forum, given valid jurisdiction
over a defendant, should not be disturbed unless weighty reasons
are presented and a suitable alternative forum is available to the
plaintiff. In light of both parties' itinerant histories, their numer-
ous contacts with the State,48 and defendant's failure to establish
prejudice to himself because of plaintiffs choice of forum, the
court determined that the lower court should not have declined
jurisdiction.49
The result in Nienow is undoubtedly correct. The facts of the
case are remarkably similar to those presented to the Supreme
Court in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.50 In Vanderbilt the husband
and wife were married in 1948 and lived together in California
until they separated in 1952. In February 1953 the wife estab-
lished a domicile in New York; the next month the husband filed
for divorce in Nevada, but the wife was not served with process
in Nevada and did not appear before the divorce court. The Ne-
vada court issued a divorce decree in June 1953. In April 1954 the
wife filed suit in New York for separation and alimony. The court
attached the husband's property in New York to obtain jurisdic-
tion and awarded the wife alimony despite a finding that the
Nevada decree had effectively dissolved the marriage between the
parties in 1953. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the
award, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the husband's claim that the award was in violation
of the court's obligation to accord full faith and credit to the
Nevada decree, which purported to terminate his obligation to
support his wife. The Court held, as the South Carolina Supreme
Court held in Nienow, that without personal jurisdiction over the
wife, a court is powerless to terminate her right to support by her
husband, and that full faith and credit need be given only to the
47. 268 S.C. at 167, 232 S.E.2d at 507. See Del Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F. Supp.
1002 (D.S.C. 1975); State v. Hill, 266 S.C. 49, 221 S.E.2d 398 (1976). See also RMTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84(c) (1971).
48. Defendant owned several corporations in South Carolina as well as over three
million dollars worth of property in Sumter. Both parties had spent considerable time in
the state over the past few years although defendant was now admittedly domiciled in
Florida. Record, vol. 1, 72-75; Brief for Appellant at 130.
49. 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504.
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divorce decree. Full faith and credit thus need not be accorded
an ex parte alimony adjudication by the courts of another state."
Clearly the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct in its
conclusion that the Florida divorce decree, made without per-
sonal jurisdiction over plaintiff, could not, under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause,5 2 bar her subsequent action for alimony in
South Carolina.
Language in the Nienow opinion, however, can be read as
according the divisible divorce doctrine a broader scope than is
constitutionally permissible. After deciding that the suit was an
action for alimony rather than for divorce, the court said
"[u]nquestionably the wife has a right to maintain such an ac-
tion pursuant to the 'divisible divorce' doctrine,"53 citing the 1963
South Carolina case of Murdock v. Murdock. 4 The Murdock
opinion cited Vanderbilt as the controlling statement of the doc-
trine. The Supreme Court said in Vanderbilt simply that
"[s]ince the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada
divorce court had no power to extinguish any right which she had
under the law of New York to financial support from her hus-
band."5 The wife in Vanderbilt had an existing right under New
York law that the Nevada court was powerless to extinguish by
its divorce decree. In Murdock, South Carolina was the marital
domicile, and the husband had left the state to obtain an ex parte
divorce elsewhere; thus, the wife had a right under South Caro-
lina law to support from her husband at the time the foreign
divorce was decreed. As in Vanderbilt, the divisible divorce doc-
trine merely preserved that right, it did not create it.
In Nienow, however, the court made no reference to a right
of support that plaintiff had under South Carolina law at the time
of the Florida divorce decree. The court's decision in the case is
undoubtedly correct because the facts indicate that plaintiff
probably had enough contacts with South Carolina at the time
of the divorce to give her a right to support under state law at that
time." Rather than determine whether she had the right to seek
51. Id. at 418-419.
52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
53. 268 S.C. at 166, 232 S.E.2d at 507.
54. 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
55. 354 U.S. at 418.
56. As the court pointed out in its statement of facts, plaintiff had moved to South
Carolina before the commencement of defendant's action in Florida and according to the




South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss1/8
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
support under State law, the court seemed to say that the divisi-
ble divorce doctrine gave her that right. The doctrine did not give
her that right, however; it merely preserved the right, if any, that
existed at the time the Florida decree was entered.
An interesting problem could arise if a divorced wife with no
previous contact with South Carolina attempts to sue her former
husband for alimony in a South Carolina court after he has ob-
tained an ex parte divorce decree elsewhere. This situation could
conceivably arise when a husband establishes residence in South
Carolina after obtaining a foreign divorce or when, as in Nienow,
a husband has substantial assets located within the state. Assum-
ing that, as in Nienow, the divorcing court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the wife and the South Carolina court does ob-
tain personal jurisdiction over the husband, nothing in the
Nienow opinion would prevent her from pursing her action. In
fact, the court said "[tihe appellant, regardless of her 'mala fide'
or 'bona fide' residency, voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction by
filing her pleading for relief. It follows that our courts had juris-
diction of both the parties and the subject matter of this ac-
tion. 5 7 The court would conclude, again, that "[u]nques-
tionably the wife has a right to maintain such an action
pursuant to the 'divisible divorce' doctrine."5 Neither Van-
derbilt nor Murdock support this position, however. In both
of those cases the courts were enforcing a right to support that
existed under the law of plaintiff's domicile before the foreign
divorce, and the divisible divorce doctrine merely preserved that
right. In this hypothetical situation there would have been no
right to support in South Carolina at the time of the divorce
because the parties had no contact with the State at that time.
In such a case reference to state law becomes crucial. Although a
divorce decree cannot cut off a wife's right to support, she may
not have the right under South Carolina law if South Carolina law
does not allow alimony to a woman whose marriage ended before
she came into the state. A number of states refuse to award ali-
mony after the marital status has already been ended by di-
vorce.-9 Those states would not allow a divorced wife to come into
57. 268 S.C. at 167, 232 S.E.2d at 507.
58. 268 S.C. at 166, 232 S.E.2d at 507.
59. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 464-65 (3d ed. 1977). See, e.g., Bowman v.
Worthington, 24 Ark. 522 (1867); McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N.W. 377 (1921);
Gosselin v. Gosselin, 294 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. App. 1973); Brown v. Brown 437 P.2d 845
(Ore. 1968); Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 454 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d 483 (1974); Brady v. Brady,
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their forum and ask for alimony, even with the application of the
divisible divorce doctrine. 0 Whether South Carolina recognizes a
right to support after divorce is unclear.' This determination
would have been critical in Nienow if plaintiff had not had suffi-
cient contact with South Carolina at the time of the divorce to
have a right to support under state law at that time. Yet the court
made reference neither to her contacts with the state at the time
of the divorce nor to her right to seek support under state law. A
precise application of the divisible divorce doctrine cannot be
made without such reference because the doctrine preserves only
those rights that exist under State law, and does not create a right
of action as the Nienow opinion suggests.
C. Divorce a Mensa et Thoro
"We therefore, hold that the cause of action for a limited
divorce a mensa et thoro does not exist in South Carolina, either
by virtue of the common law or statute.""2 So Chief Justice Lewis,
writing for a unanimous court in Nocher v. Nocher,11 disposed of
the cause of action for divorce a mensa et thoro in South Carolina.
This announcement was a startling revelation not only to the
bench and bar, but to numerous individuals who had been
granted this limited form of divorce by South Carolina courts. "4
Nocher was a wife's action in the Richland County Court for
a divorce a mensa et thoro on grounds of desertion. Defendant, a
Virginia resident, made a special appearance to contest the lower
court's jurisdiction to grant the divorce and award alimony, child
support, and custody of the children. The court sustained his
objection except that part relating to the divorce and the award
of child custody, and it granted plaintiff a divorce a mensa et
thoro.11 On appeal defendant maintained his objection to the
60. See Loeb v. Loeb, 4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36 (1958) (the New York Court of
Appeals held that even in light of Vanderbilt a divorced wife who was not a domiciliary
of New York when the ex parte divorce was granted was precluded by the New York
alimony statute from later suing for alimony in New York).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (1976) empowers the courts to award alimony at the
time a divorce is granted. The court in Nienow relied on Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C.
90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951) for the proposition that a court has inherent authority to grant
support apart from divorce. That case, however, concerned granting support before, not
after, the termination of the marriage.
62. Nocher v. Nocher, 268 S.C. 503, 510, 234 S.E.2d 884, 887 (1977).
63. Id.
64. A divorce a mensa et thoro is defined as "[a] partial or qualified divorce, by
which the parties are separated and forbidden to live or cohabit together, without affecting
the marriage itself." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 566 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
65. See 268 S.C. at 506, 234 S.E.2d at 885.
[Vol. 30
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lower court's jurisdiction and also challenged the existence of a
cause of action in South Carolina for a divorce a mensa et thoro
on grounds of desertion before the one-year statutory period for
desertion has elapsed.66 The supreme court held that by raising
the latter issue, defendant waived his jurisdictional objection."
The court therefore remanded the case for a determination of all
issues. Noting that the question of the existence of a cause of
action for a divorce a mensa et thoro would be involved in the
lower court proceeding on remand, the court undertook to resolve
the issue immediately, although it was not argued in the briefs
of either party.
Chief Justice Lewis' opinion relied heavily on Justice Bus-
sey's learned concurring opinion in Brewer v. Brewer,18 a case
involving a wife's request that she be awarded a legal separation
and both lump-sum and periodic alimony. The Brewer court af-
firmed the denial of her request for a lump-sum and held that the
statute allowing a court to award alimony did not permit an
award of both periodic and lump-sum payments. 9
In his lengthy concurrence in Brewer, Justice Bussey re-
viewed the history of divorce in South Carolina, and concluded
that no action for divorce a mensa et thoro exists. Justice Bussey
criticized the bench and bar for using the terms "legal separa-
tion," "divorce a mensa et thoro," and "separate support and
maintenance" interchangeably. This practice, he asserted, had
led to the mistaken impression that South Carolina law provides
an action for divorce a mensa et thoro.
70
"Legal separation" is a generic term, "without any specific
definition, which is rather loosely applied to various situations
where the husband and wife are living apart at least temporarily
under some sanction of contract or law."71 Separate support and
maintenance provides for support without the imposition of a
decree dissolving the marriage. 72 While the marriage is not dis-
solved by a divorce a mensa et thoro, a court decree compels the
parties to live apart.73 South Carolina is the only state in the
66. Brief for Appellant at 5; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(2) (1976).
67. 268 S.C. at 507, 234 S.E.2d at 885-86 (citing South Carolina State Highway Dep't
v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 210 S.C. 408, 43 S.E.2d 132 (1947)).
68. 242 S.C. 9, 129 S.E.2d 736 (1963).
69. Id., construing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-3-130 to -140 (1976). Justice Lewis interest-
ingly concurred in the majority opinion in Bussey.
70. Id. at 20-21, 129 S.E.2d at 741-42.
71. Id.
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Union that deals with divorce in its constitution," and for most
of its history it prohibited divorce altogether.75 Yet, as Justice
Bussey observed, even while denying their power to grant a di-
vorce under their general equity jurisdiction, state courts consis-
tently decreed separate support and maintenance in appropriate
cases.
70
Justice Bussey also disposed of a South Carolina statute
77
that provides that courts may allow alimony in divorces a mensa
et thoro on the same basis that it is awarded in divorces a uinculo
matrimonii.71 While that statute suggests an apparent legislative
recognition of divorce a mesna et thoro, more than a mere implied
recognition is required when the common law prohibits such a
divorce, Justice Bussey asserted. Whenever possible a statute
enacted in derogation of common-law principles must be strictly
construed to avoid a conflict.79 Moreover, the statutory language
did not suffice to create a new cause of action because no remedy
is complete without a definition of the cases to which it shall
extend and because a mere grant of judicial power does not itself
create a cause of action." The statute does not specify the
grounds for divorce a mensa et thoro, nor provide any other guide-
lines for its application. One might surmise that the statute was
enacted upon the same misconception elucidated above.
Justice Bussey's concern over the bench's and bar's impre-
cise use of the terms "legal separation," "separate support and
maintenance," and "divorce a mensa et thoro" concerned Chief
Justice Lewis as well. He stated in Nocher that in practice, abro-
gation of divorce a mensa et thoro will have little effect: the
grounds that would be sufficient to sustain a divorce a mensa et
74. S.C. CONST., art. 17, § 3.
75. Shaw v. Shaw, 256 S.C. 453, 182 S.E.2d 865 (1971).
76. In Converse v. Converse, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich. Eq.) 535, 539 (1856), the court said:
The ecclesiastical court of England has the power of decreeing a separation
a mensa et thoro, but the court of equity has no such jurisdiction. A jurisdiction
of this kind appertains to no court in South Carolina. Under the circumstances
of this case, the court might go so far (if necessary) as to protect the wife from
the cruelty of the husband.
Id. See also Taylor v. Taylor, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 167 (1811); Anonymous, 2 S.C. Eq. (2
Des.) 198 (1803).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-140 (1976) states: "In all actions for divorce a mensa et
thoro, allowances of alimony and suit money pendente lite shall be made according to the
principles controlling such allowances in actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii."
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thoro normally will more than suffice to sustain an action for
separate support and maintenance.8 ' His interest was in restoring
precision to litigation and adjudication of support and separation
cases in South Carolina. Perhaps, as well, he meant to encourage
the legislature to remedy the ambiguity in the statutes either by
expressly authorizing actions for divorce a mensa et thoro or by
removing all mention of them. 2
It is unclear what practical changes in divorce laws will occur
because of the court's holding in Nocher. Justice Bussey sug-
gested that awards of lump sums are improper in an action for
only separate support and maintenance.83 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, Chief Justice Lewis was less than emphatic in his assur-
ance that pleadings for a divorce a mensa et thoro would satisfy
the requirement for separate support and maintenance. Neither
he nor Justice Bussey attempted a final resolution of this issue.
Perhaps some substantive changes will come from the decision.
This speculation, of course, will be merely academic should the
legislature enact a positive authorization of the cause of action.
In any event, the bench and bar may consider themselves pro-
perly rebuked for their past imprecision in their treatment of
separation and support cases in both litigation and adjudication.
I. FAMILY COURT RULES
In recent years, considerable interest in formalizing family
courts procedures has been voiced. This interest culminated in
the promulgation of the new Rules of Practice for the Family
Courts of the State of South Carolina, effective July 1, 1977.84
Part of this interest stemmed from growing federal concern with
due process in juvenile criminal proceedings. The United States
Supreme Court's 1967 holding in In re Gault," in which the Court
announced that more procedural formality to safeguard the con-
81. 268 S.C. at 510, 234 S.E.2d at 887.
82. Indications are that the South Carolina General Assembly may be receptive to
the suggestion. House Bill No. 3183, introduced on June 2, 1977, less than three weeks
after the Nocher decision, and Senate Bill No. 588 introduced soon thereafter, both estab-
lish a cause of action for divorce a mensa et thoro.
83. 242 S.C. at 18, 189 S.E.2d at 790 (citing Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S.C. 93,
195 S.E. 122 (1938)).
84. These rules are reprinted in vol. 22, S.C. CODE ANN. (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977)
(hereinafter cited FAMmY CouRT RuLs). The rules were promulgated by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional authority. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4
(1895, amended 1973).
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stitutional rights of juveniles is needed, exemplifies this concern.
In South Carolina, both juvenile criminal cases and domestic
relations cases are heard in the family courts. To an extent, then,
the formalization of domestic relations adjudication in South
Carolina is a byproduct of the state supreme court's increased
awareness of the need for additional due process guarantees in the
,area of juvenile criminal law."6
A more important reason for the revision of the rules was the
recent unification of the court system in the State. The first step
in this process was the Family Court Act of 1968,87 which regular-
ized the family courts that counties had established, or would
establish in the future. It specified, among other things, the ap-
pointment of judges, the powers of the courts, and their jurisdic-
tion, granting them jurisdiction concurrent with that of the cir-
cuit courts in most areas of domestic relations. In 1973, a consti-
tutional amendment required that the courts of the State be re-
aligned into a unified judicial system.-' The counties are no longer
able to set up their own family courts, as the Family Court Act
had permitted. Purusant to the new constitutional mandate, Act
690 of 19769 placed the family courts under the unified statewide
system, establishing one court for each judicial district. More-
over, it gave the family courts exclusive jurisdiction in matters
over which they had previously been given jurisdiction under the
Family Court Act. No longer would the jurisdiction of the family
courts be concurrent with that of the circuit courts. Under the
1976 act, the family courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all
divorce actions and, if prayed for in the pleadings thereto, over
the settlement of all legal and equitable rights incidental to them.
They also have exclusive jurisdiction over actions for separation,
separate maintenance, child custody and support, visitation, and
the division of personal property, whether or not in connection
with the divorce action. 0
86. Rules of Practice for the Family Courts of South Carolina-An Overview, unpub-
lished introductory address to the Family Court Rules delivered by Louis Rosen, Assistant
Director for Family Courts, South Carolina Court Administration, at the Family Court
Judicial Conference in Columbia (May 23, 1977).
87. Act No. 1195, 1968 S.C. Acts 2718 (codified at S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 14-21-10 to -
1060 (1976)).
88. The amendment to Article V of the South Carolina Constitution was amended
by Act No. 132, 1973 S.C. Acts 161.
89. 1976 S.C. Acts 1859 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21-10 to -1606 (Cum. Supp.
1977)).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21-415, -1020 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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The desirability of more formalized procedures in the family
court system is apparent. No longer is it satisfactory for the courts
to formulate their own procedures on a county-by-county basis,
for now they are part of a unified court system and have a clearly
defined scope of exclusive jurisdiction. Appropriately, the su-
preme court, in its supervisory role, imposed upon the courts rules
commensurate with the newly acquired authority of the lower
tribunals. Hence, the new family court rules became effective on
July 1, 1977, the same date that Act 690 took effect.
The rules relating to domestic relations were not taken from
any one source. Although some were borrowed from other states,
they are mostly a product of the experience of family law practice
in South Carolina. Where a need was perceived, a rule was writ-
ten to satisfy that need, but none was written when a satisfactory
statute or circuit court rule that would be applicable to the situa-
tion was in effect.'
The twenty old rules were replaced by forty-nine new ones;
of these, twenty-six deal solely with domestic relations. The in-
crease in number alone evidences that the revisions have brought
about material changes in family law practice. The new rules are
so different from the old ones that making a rule-by-rule compari-
son of them serves no purpose. Furthermore, the supreme court
has yet to interpret any but a few of the new rules. While no
substitute for a careful reading of the rules exists, a few observa-
tions about them may be informative to those not already famil-
iar with them.
Under the old rules, some judges required as a matter of
course that both parties in a contested divorce action be repre-
sented by counsel. Under new rules 4 and 25,52 uniform rules are
provided. Rule 4 requires all parties to be represented by counsel
unless the judge has given written permission for a party to pro-
91. Interview with Judge Donald Fanning, Chief Family Court Judge for the Four-
teenth Judicial Circuit (Beaufort, S.C., March 24, 1978).
92. Rule 4, entitled "Representation by counsel," states:
No case shall be entertained by the Court unless all parties are represented by
counsel; provided that the judge may give written permission with a statement
of his reasons therefor to a party to proceed without the benefit of counsel.
FAMILY CoURT RULES (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Rule 25, entitled "Explanation of procedures," states:
In any civil proceedings, the court shall explain to the parties, if not repre-
sented by counsel (1) the substance of the petition, (2) the stage of the proceed-
ing, (3) the issues to be decided and (4) such other matters as will enable the
parties to understand the proceedings.
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ceed without an attorney. Rule 25 requires the judge to explain
the proceedings to those not represented by counsel. Although a
party may represent himself before the family court, the judge is
left with the responsibility of maintaining control over the pro-
ceedings by granting or refusing to grant permission for the party
to do so and by ensuring that he understands the nature of the
proceedings as the trial progresses.
Rule 713 provides that a defendant may be declared in default
if he fails to answer a petition. The defendant in a divorce action,
however, cannot be declared in default. Rule 1611 specifies that
"No judgment, other than a dismissal for want of prosecution,
shall be entered in an action for divorce, except after hearing."
Rule 281' states that no divorce shall be granted unless testimony
is sworn in open court. These rules preclude a divorce from being
granted solely on the basis of an unanswered petition; clearly a
hearing at which sworn testimony is taken must be held.
Other than this, however, the rules do not say what sort of
hearing is required, and this silence poses a problem in uncon-
tested divorce actions. In undefended proceedings the judge may
not ignore rules of practice and procedure, and he must require
the petitioner to prove the allegations as if the action were ac-
tually contested." The South Carolina Supreme Court has said
that a divorce will not be granted on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of either or both parties because of the danger of collusive
divorce suits." The danger is greatest in default cases, and special
attention is warranted in those actions. Unlike other civil actions,
93. Rule 7, entitled "Responsive pleadings," states:
The pleading on behalf of the Respondent shall be an answer or counter-
claim which shall be served on the Petitioner or his attorney within twenty (20)
days after service of the petition. Where a Responent fails to answer or otherwise
plead to the petition, he may be declared in default.
FAMILY COURT RULES (Cum. Supp. 1977).
94. Rule 16, entitled "No judgment without hearing; appearance by respondent,"
states:
No judgment, other than a dismissal for want of prosecution, shall be en-
tered in an action for divorce except after hearing. Even though the respondent
does not file an answer, he may, with permission of the Court, be heard on issues
of custody of children, alimony, support, and counsel fees.
FAMILY COURT RULES (CuM. Supp. 1977).
95. Rule 28, entitled "Divorce testimony," states:
The Court, as a court of record, shall grant no divorce unless testimony
sworn in open court before the Judge is recorded and filed.
FAMILY COURT RULES (CuM. Supp. 1977).
96. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 149 (1959); 24 Am. JUn. Divorce & Separation § 425 (1966).
97. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 244 S.C. 265, 270, 136 S.E.2d 537, 539 (1964) (citing
Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949)).
[Vol. 30
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a divorce is not merely a prize to go to the victor; the State,
because of its public policy in favor of keeping families together,
stands as an interested quasi-party. The South Carolina Supreme
Court explains this relationship between the State and the par-
ties as follows:
In a controversy relating to marriage the Court is concerned not
only with the rights of the individuals involved but also with the
public interest. A duty rests upon the Court to encourage the
parties to live together, to see that the marriage status is not
disturbed except under circumstances and for causes fully sanc-
tioned by Law, and to prevent fraudulent and collusive divorces.
Accordingly, a judgment by default is not favored in divorce
suits and will be set aside more readily than default judgments
in other actions.98
Rule 16 should be read as requiring a full evidentiary hearing
in divorce actions, and imposing upon family court judges the
obligation to ensure that the petitioner adequately proves the
charges against the respondent, even in default cases. This is
especially important in South Carolina, where no provision for a
no-fault divorce for fewer than three years separation exists.9 The
result is that virtually every divorce petition must allege some
misconduct, which must be proved. Rules 7 and 16 must not be
read to allow a divorce solely on the basis of an unanswered com-
plaint or a token hearing.
Rule 18100 provides that certain documents are admissible in
98. Grant v. Grant, 233 S.C. 433, 437, 105 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1958) (citations omitted).
99. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (1976); S.C. CONST. art. 17, § 3 (1895, amended
1949).
100. Rule 18, entitled "Admissibility of certain documents," states:
The following documents and written statements shall be admissible in
evidence without requiring that the person or institution issuing the documents
or statements be present in Court:
(a) A written statement of a child's attendance at school, signed by a
School Principal or duly authorized school official.
(b) The school report card showing the child's record of attendance,
grades on subjects taught and other pertinent information, provided that this
be a report sent out at periodic intervals by the school.
(c) The written statement by a physician showing that the patient was
treated at certain times and the type of ailment.
(d) The written report of the Department of Social Services or other
agency, reporting the home investigation or any other report required by the
Court.
(e) The written statement of an employer showing wages either weekly or
monthly for a given period of time and W-2 statement, income tax returns and
other reports of like nature.
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evidence without the issuer's presence in court. Those documents
are: (1) a written statement of a child's school attendance record,
(2) a child's report card, (3) a written statement from a physician
concerning his treatment of a patient, (4) a DSS report, and (5)
a written statement from an employer showing wages paid for a
given period of time or a W-2 statement or similar document
showing a person's income.
In other jurisdictions similar rules have come under criticism
for their disregard of the hearsay rule.'0 ' Typically this problem
arises when the court uses a report from a social service agency
to help decide the issue of child custody. Arguably, to deny a
party the opportunity to cross-examine the issuer of a damaging
report is a denial of procedural due process' 2 and, in some cases,
a contravention of the constitutional right to confront adverse
witnesses.' 3 This argument has been rejected, however, in the
jurisdictions that have considered it.'"' In Kern v. Kern'°5 the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute allowing the court to
consider reports submitted by a state social agency concerning a
child's home conditions. Recognizing that in cases involving chil-
dren, the parents' rights are secondary to the children's best in-
terests, the Florida court held that "by providing the trial court
with potentially valuable information compiled by professional
social workers, the instant statute constitutes a legislative cogni-
tion of the suitability of modified proceedings in this special
area"'06 and "of the necessity for professional social workers' in-
vestigative skills and personal counseling as a means of furthering
the trial court's search for just and humane results in this sensi-
tive area. '
When documents are admitted under Rule 18, a question
exists concerning the parties' access to them during the hearing
for the purpose of rebutting them. Under the old rules either
101. See, e.g., Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. App. 1975) (dissenting
opinion). See also appellant's argument in Kern v. Kern, 333 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1976).
102. See note 94 supra.
103. Kern v. Kern, 333 So. 2d at 18. The sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal trial to confront the wit-
nesses against him.
104. Kern v. Kern, 333 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1976); see, e.g., Swain v. Swain, 250 Cal. App.
2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1967); Forslund v. Forslund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 37 Cal. Rptr.
489 (1964); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 304 Mass. 248, 23 N.E.2d 405 (1939). See generally Com-
ment, Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 349 (1957).
105. 333 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1976).
106. Id. at 20.
107. Id. at 21.
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parent who felt prejudiced by introduction of a document could
submit evidence to explain or contradict the document,' but the
new rule does not have this express provision. Although the courts
of other states have upheld the admissibility of documents in
contravention of the hearsay rule, they have consistently reversed
trial court decisions in which the trial judge refused to allow the
parties access to the documents." 9 The derogation of the parents'
rights in the interest of the childrens' welfare stops short of deny-
ing them the opportunity to rebut damaging testimony. Rule 18
should not be construed, then, to allow a judge to consider docu-
ments without allowing the parties access to them.
One rule that should find extensive application by the bar is
Rule 22.""0 Under the old rules, no formalized discovery proce-
dures existed. Rule 22, however, provides for discovery either by
stipulation of both parties or by order of the court. Discovery is
now limited only by a party's ability to convince the court of his
need for information. While the rule purports to encourage coop-
eration between the parties in the exchange of information, a
litigant should remember the discretion granted to the court by
this rule and should not hesitate to appeal to the court when he
feels that his opponent will not cooperate with his attempts at
discovery. This should especially be true when a compelling need
for discovery exists; in such cases, the litigant should be prepared
to argue this need before the court, and the court is most likely
to be receptive to a well-made argument.
Rule 8"' prohibits a family court judge from giving an order
108. Rule 12, FAMILY COURT RULES (1976) (superseded).
109. Kern v. Kern, 333 So. 2d at 19; see, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 140 So. 2d 354
(Fla. App. 1962); Herb v. Herb, 8 A.D.2d 414, 188 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1959); Dees v. Dees, 41
Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969).
110. Rule 22, entitled "Deposition and discovery," states:
Recognizing the unique nature of the Court's jurisdiction and the need for
a speedy determination thereof, the prompt voluntary exchange of information
and documents by parties prior to trial is encouraged. However, formal deposi-
tions or discovery shall be conducted only by stipulation of the parties or by
Court order upon application therefore in writing. Such an order may prescribe
the manner, time, conditions and restrictions pertaining to the deposition or
discovery.
FAMILY COURT RULES (Cum. Supp. 1977).
111. Rule 8, entitled "Reference," states:
In no case may a judge give an order of reference unless the caseload of the
Court indicates that the matter to be referred could not be reached by the Court
within a reasonable time. Such an order of reference shall be in writing and
submitted to the office of South Carolina Court Administration for its approval
prior to reference.
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of reference unless serious time constraints are involved and he
has obtained written permission from the office of South Carolina
Court Administation. This rule will have several effects. First, the
new family court system came under some early criticism for
having too many new judges. " ' In many circuits the practice was
to refer most contested cases, with the judge hearing only uncon-
tested cases and confirming referees' reports in others."13 The
Chief Justice and the Office of Court Administration wrote Rule
8 to ensure full utilization of judicial manpower."4 The result is
that the family court judges must assume greater responsibilities
to justify their number. Second, litigants in almost every case will
find themselves arguing before the same judge who will ulti-
mately issue the order.
The third effect deals with the scope of review to be used by
the supreme court on appeal from family court adjudications.
The court has traditionally undertaken a de novo review in ac-
tions tried in equity without reference; it has treated the lower
court's judgment with deference only when two judges-the mas-
ter and the trial judge-have examined the evidence and con-
curred in the findings prior to the appeal."5 The result is that
although the family courts have acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over domestic relations cases and have won a regular position in
the State's new unified judiciary, the supreme court has retained
a high degree of supervision over their adjudications by undertak-
ing an independent review of the evidence in almost every case
that is appealed from them.
The new Family Court Rules will have a varying impact on
family court practice in South Carolina. Some of the rules are
merely clarifications of well-accepted principles, some provide
certainty where uncertainty reigned before, and some implement
the evolving philosophy of the family court system."6
The rules may be generally characterized as formalizing fam-
ily court procedures, yet most of the rules allow the trial judge
discretion to permit variances when circumstances dictate. This
discretion allows the judge to maintain the role of adjudicator-
112. Letter from Donald A. Fanning, Chief Family Court Judge of the Fourteenth
Judicial Circuit, to author (April 25, 1978).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Wood v. Wood, 269 S.C. 600, 239 S.E.2d 315 (1977); Albritton v. Albritton, 260
S.C. 61, 194 S.E.2d 197 (1973).
116. See notes 76-83 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 30
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss1/8
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
counsellor into which he is inevitably cast by the very nature of
the matters under his jurisdiction. The competing interests of
individual rights, child welfare, and public policy dictate that
family court procedures, though formal, be flexible.
A complete system of rules for the family courts means that
family court procedure can be uniform throughout the state, as
indeed it should be under the concept of a unified judiciary. The
new rules should provide the uniformity, flexibility, and formal-
ity necessary to achieve the goal expressed in their "Scope and
Purpose": "To effectuate the legislative intent to establish a uni-
form court with original jurisdiction over family and child mat-
ters and offenses, and to insure, to the extent possible, swift,
practical and inexpensive adjudication and determination of
domestic and delinquency matters" and "to provide simplified
procedures consistent with standard pleading and practice proce-
dures so that all persons shall receive a full and just resolution of
their case.""' 7
Dawes Cooke
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